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Endnote: Untoward
PETER GOODRICH*

A plethora of readings. Indeed a brace of Readers, two Lecturers - the word
a base Latinity for Reader - and a name which is but a double 'r' away from
Booke. The sum of which is a thoroughly literary endeavour, a bookish
event, a series of textual exhalations. The first question to be asked,
untoward though it may be, is what have the Readers been reading? The rest
will follow from the answer to that question.
The initial answer is that the configuration 'Law and Literature' allows
for a reading of literary texts. Aside from the innominate marginal scribble
that Goodrich reads, the gathering of texts analysed, interpreted, and brought
to law are entirely literary. There is a little hedonism, a touch of reverie, as
well as an expansive gesture toward accessibility, in the selection of books
being read. Melanie Williams turns to W.H. Auden and questions the trauma
that motivates specific, nominate, theories of law. Her concern is with the
'unconscious trends', the patterns and repetitions that lead from 'September
1, 1939', a poem which Auden wrote in New York at the outbreak of World
War II, and September 11, 2001. If there is a motif it is a line that Auden
changed from 'We must love one another or die' to 'We must love one
another and die'.
Melanie Williams conjures a trauma that is perceived as external to law
but which is in fact internal to legal thought. The poet's concerns with crisis,
the failure of reason, with love and war can be traced in displaced form in the
history of jurisprudence. She offers a reading that is against the grain, a
subtle and untoward interpretation that Adam Gearey picks up in analysing
the words of Desmond Tutu and of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. He also plays upon a contrary or untoward grain, a legal
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poetics, an aesthetic jurisdiction, .a yearning for an outside that finds muted
expression, a whisper internal to law: 'And yet/Through glass and bars/Some
dream a wild sunset/Waiting stars.'
The paradox of Truth and Reconciliation was that of a law that was not
law. Its function was to tell a truth that could never be present. You need in
some degree to be a poet to understand an unknowable justice or to glimpse a
truth that is untoward or marked by indirection. Adam Gearey wishes 'to tell
it slant' . He punctures the normality of legalism with a competing text and
law, and the prize - if reading can produce a prize - is a poetic confrontation
as much as it is a confrontation with poetry. In Patrick Hanafin's term,
offered in the course of a reading of Blanchot, it is an act of insubordination.
For him, literature rebels against law in a profoundly political manner.
Literature, as he argues here and elsewhere, is the pharmakon, both poison
and remedy, source and cure of the malady of law. Literature is here the
resistance, the residue of failed dreams, the call to arms, the political hope of
making law anew. In his version, literature is untoward in that it calls away
from the boredom and stasis of legalism, it seduces and garners a literary
community that will 'unwrite' and so cure the law.
If Patrick Hanafin is a little untoward, or locally insubordinate, Piyel
Haldar provides a trope that offers an epoch and a whole continent of
salacious indirection. The jurisprudence of travel literature goes wholly
against the grain. He reads a genre of commentaries upon despotism as the
oriental mode of law. He portrays a vast myth, a juggernaut of juristic
fantasms, a radically subversive look at the inside of Western law as it stares
out at Eastern practices. The imperialistic complacency of what Selden
dubbed 'dulling custom' and the immemorial practice of common law, is
juxtaposed to descriptions of the bedevilled aberrations, the monstrosity, the
luxury and excess, the sheer deadly pleasure, the salacious cruelty of
despotism.
Haldar's point is that there is as much desire as there is disapproval in
the excessively detailed depictions of oriental life. There is as much
projection as there is objection. To borrow a wordplay of Hanafin's, the
obsession with harems and sudden death does not so much inscribe as describe or unwrite the Western law that so enjoys detailing the pleasures of
the East. Suffice to say that in all of this there is a most untoward thread of
hedonism, of motive force, of the contrary and cutting. Literature objects
to law as it is currently written. The literary can play with law, and in the
longer term literature can come to play the law or at least teach lawyers to
write differently.
I cannot make much of that last remark here. This is an endnote, though of
course it is neither an end nor a note, just something untoward. So I will
fulfill that indirection by looking finally at the Booke. If the topic is law and
literature, then there is presumably no reason to exclude the possibility of a
contribution from a literary scholar or, as it happens here, from Brooker. In
fact Brooker's contribution is emblematic. In one sense that is because he is
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assisted by knowing what he is talking about, literature being his discipline,
his profession, and his institutional love. In another sense he personifies the
untoward. The lawyers in this volume all engage with literary texts as a way
of challenging the stylistic, textual, and hedonic limits of law. They argue in
variable forms that literature represents a fracture, a crisis, a puncture of the
legal restraint of the text. They use poems, fictions, insubordinate acts, and
wild writings as a way of getting outside of the norm of legal writing and so
bringing to consciousness the politics of law's inscription.
Brooker is wise to all of that, and as a lone literary scholar he holds the
mirror to the maundering of law. He takes as his text a literary law and
analyses the judgments handed down by a court of voluntary jurisdiction, the
invention of Flann O'Brien (or Nolan, or na gCopaleen). His question is:
what constitutes a positive law of literature? O'Brien's wit and wordplay
produce a satirical law, a better-written and infinitely less inflated text. It is a
version of the slanted reading that Adam Gearey sought in the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission report, a truth that undoes itself in the very
moment of its enunciation, a law that recognizes that it is also lawless, a
written judgment that mimics the legal and yet is literary and far from
entirely serious.
The crux of Brooker's essay, his most untoward moment, comes in the
form of a Menippean instance of satirical play. A defendant confesses to his
failure to abscond. The grounds are linguistic. Had he not appeared then 'too
well I knew that my bail would not be confiscated. Neither would it be
impounded (Here defendant became moved.) Neither would it be declared
forfeit - or even forfeited. It would not be attached. It would be ... (Here
defendant broke down and began to weep.) ... My bail would be
ESTREATED.' Brooker cunningly comments that the term 'estreat' is
recondite. No question about that. It is positively untoward and definitely in
need of a little explanation.
Estreat, we are told in Rastell's Termes de la Ley 'is a figure or
resemblance, and is commonly used for the copy or true note of an original
writing, as estreats of amerciaments'. 1 So the es treat ironically concerns the
truth of a writing that has been misplaced or at least is not available in the
original. It is a fiction in the sense that the estreat is legally true and yet in
fact unverifiable. Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium lists the estreat under the
general title of a writ of moderata misericordia, or moderate mercy, a writ
that seeks to limit the amount of damages. The estreat, and even Fiann
O'Brien would be hard pressed to concoct quite such a baroque fantasia of
juridisms, was used 'where there are many plaintiffs named, and they
amerced, the clerk hath forgotten, and cannot shew how the usage hath been
to make the estreats against them ... For it cannot properly be said that a
man hath mercy shewed and offered unto him ifhe shall pay, or shall be put
to more charge for the offence of another person, which himself hath not
J. Rastell, Les Termes de la Ley (1566, 1812 edn.) at 208.
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done. ' 2 It is lost in translation, but broadly means that the party estreated is
legally proven to be the party amerced, or the one who owes the damages.
O'Brien's defendant might well weep at being estreated. He is being
named, interpellated by the law. Estreatment, in other words, is the punctum,
the moment when the law leaves the Booke and interrupts life. In its more
modem definitions, the estreat is precisely the moment of collection, the
instance of leaving the chain of records and enforcing the fine. 3 The estreat,
however, also testifies to the imperfection of the record and the necessity of
mercy or equity because of the failure of memory, and the infinite regress of
writing. A record only ever refers to something absent but noted and in a
similar vein what is written will always refer to other writings, and here to
absent texts. By the same token, this precariously literary quality of law
provides the possibility of interruption, whether pathological, hedonistic,
serious or satirical.
So here is my hypothesis and envoi: the function of the literary is that of
estreating the study of law. Literature does not treat law, it estreats law,
which means that it plays with the law so as to reinforce or subvert or amend
or destroy as occasion warrants. Literature moves beyond the law, it makes a
fictional, and so, imperfect copy and then indicates or alludes to the fact that
copies are all that we have. The estreat is a reference to the necessary
disjunction between record and recollection, and the estreatment of law by
literature means travelling beyond the record, taking law outside itself, so as
to go back in. In the jargon of Hollywood you need a treatment to pitch a
movie. The treatment gives you the basic image of the movie: let's say
Atlantis filmed in the Arctic to which the studio types would say 'no way,
there would be white out'. The estreatment is a similar accounting of the
image of a law: let's say the Irish Constitution, and O'Brien, the head of
fiction, calls it 'desperate and dark of hue' or simply terribly written. If that
is the case, if it is poorly inscribed, then tear it up, whether text or law or
constitution and write it anew.

2 A. Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium (1514, 1793 edn.) at 75-6.
3 As, for example, Black's Law Dictionary (1999, 7th edn.) at 572.
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